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Andrew Tyrie MP
House of Commons

By hand

27 March 2006

Dear Mr Tyrie

All Party Parliamentary Committee on Extraordinary Rendition

I enclose a copy of 18 pages of exhibits to the open statement of Security Service witness A, disclosed to my clients in judicial review proceedings, with the consent of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Yours sincerely



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enc

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*Criminal
Defence Service*



*Community
Legal Service*



Specialist Help Point

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

CO 10470/05

IN THE MATTER OF A CLAIM FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

BETWEEN

THE QUEEN

**(on the application of (1) Bisher Al Rawi (2) Jamil El Banna
(3) Omar Deghayes (4) Wahab Mr Al Rawi (5) Jahida Sayyadi
(6) Sabah Sunnoqrot (7) Abubaker Deghayes)**

Claimants

- and -

**(1) The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
(2) The Secretary of State for the Home Department**

Defendants

EXHIBIT A1

**TO THE OPEN STATEMENT OF
SECURITY SERVICE WITNESS "A"**

28/09/2001



**Press Release
SC/7158**

Security Council
4385th Meeting (Night)

**SECURITY COUNCIL UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTS WIDE-RANGING ANTI-TERRORISM
RESOLUTION;**

CALLS FOR SUPPRESSING FINANCING, IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Resolution 1373 (2001) Also Creates Committee to Monitor Implementation

Reaffirming its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist acts that took place in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania on 11 September, the Security Council this evening unanimously adopted a wide-ranging, comprehensive resolution with steps and strategies to combat international terrorism.

By resolution 1373 (2001) the Council also established a Committee of the Council to monitor the resolution's implementation and called on all States to report on actions they had taken to that end no later than 90 days from today.

Under terms of the text, the Council decided that all States should prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, as well as criminalize the wilful provision or collection of funds for such acts. The funds, financial assets and economic resources of those who commit or attempt to commit terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts and of persons and entities acting on behalf of terrorists should also be frozen without delay.

The Council also decided that States should prohibit their nationals or persons or entities in their territories from making funds, financial assets, economic resources, financial or other related services available to persons who commit or attempt to commit, facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts. States should also refrain from providing any form of support to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts; take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts; deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, commit terrorist acts and provide safe havens as well.

By other terms, the Council decided that all States should prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other countries and their citizens. States should also ensure that anyone who has participated in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice. They should also ensure that terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the seriousness of such acts is duly reflected in sentences served.

By further terms, the Council decided that States should afford one another the greatest measure of assistance for criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts. States should also prevent the movement of terrorists or their groups by effective border controls as well.

Also by the text, the Council called on all States to intensify and accelerate the exchange of information regarding terrorist actions or movements; forged or falsified documents; traffic in arms and sensitive material; use of communications and technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction.

States were also called on to exchange information and cooperate to prevent and suppress terrorist acts and to take action against the perpetrators of such acts. States should become parties to, and fully implement as soon as possible, the relevant international conventions and protocols to combat terrorism.

By the text, before granting refugee status, all States should take appropriate measures to ensure that the asylum seekers had not planned, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts. Further, States should ensure that refugee status was not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation were not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists.

The Council noted with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money laundering and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other deadly materials. In that regard, it emphasized the need to enhance the coordination of national, subregional, regional and international efforts to strengthen a global response to that threat to international security.

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, the Council expressed its determination to take all necessary steps to fully implement the current resolution.

The meeting, which began at 10:50 p.m., adjourned at 10:53 p.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 1373 (2001) reads as follows:

**The Security Council,*

**Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001,*

**Reaffirming also its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which took place in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, and expressing its determination to prevent all such acts,*

**Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security,*

**Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001),*

**Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,*

**Deeply concerned by the increase, in various regions of the world, of acts of terrorism motivated by intolerance or extremism,*

**Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to terrorism,*

**Recognizing the need for States to complement international cooperation by taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful means, the financing and preparation of any acts of terrorism,*

**Reaffirming the principle established by the General Assembly in its declaration of October 1970 (resolution 2625 (XXV)) and reiterated by the Security Council in its resolution 1189 (1998) of 13 August 1998, namely that every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts,*

**Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,*

**1. Decides that all States shall:*

**(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;*

**(b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;*

**(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities;*

**(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;*

**2. Decides also that all States shall:*

**(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;*

**(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange of information;*

**(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;*

**(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;*

**(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;*

**(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings;*

**(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents;*

**3. Calls upon all States to:*

**(a) Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks; forged or falsified travel documents; traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of communications technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups;*

"(b) Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts;

"(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts;

"(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999;

"(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);

"(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts;

"(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists;

"4. Notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard *emphasizes* the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security;

"5. *Declares* that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations;

"6. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to monitor implementation of this resolution, with the assistance of appropriate expertise, and *calls upon* all States to report to the Committee, no later than 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution and thereafter according to a timetable to be proposed by the Committee, on the steps they have taken to implement this resolution;

"7. *Directs* the Committee to delineate its tasks, submit a work programme within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, and to consider the support it requires, in consultation with the Secretary-General;

"8. *Expresses* its determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full implementation of this resolution, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter;

"9. *Decides* to remain seized of this matter."

.....

CCD [REDACTED]

CCD [REDACTED]

CCD [REDACTED]

NOTE FOR FILE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Date: 31 October 2002

SUBJECT: Meeting with Abu ANAS

Summary

Unannounced visit to ANAS at home by [REDACTED] and MPSB D/Sgt [REDACTED] ANAS welcoming and apparently friendly; denies any involvement in extremist activity; concerned about being arrested or turned back when leaving for Gambia, or being excluded once outside the country; asks about progress of application for British nationality and possibility of a return of personal items seized during police raid last year; shows no interest in resettlement package in return for co-operation.

Detail

2. On 31 October at 0845hrs, I and [REDACTED] of MPSB called at ANAS's home at 15 Tintern Ave, NW9. This is a reasonably well maintained 1930's semi, probably worth around £300,000 if the local estate agents window is anything to go by. Parked on the drive at the front was a small silver coloured car, VRN ?M439 ELB displaying a green L plate.
3. ANAS opened the door himself; in Arabic, I introduced us as Michael from the British Government and Andy from Scotland Yard and asked if we could have a brief chat with him. He immediately invited us in and took us into the living room at the back of the house; his wife, dressed in traditional full length hijab but with the face uncovered, and three young children were already in there so we waited in the corridor in case either ANAS or his wife were sensitive about us being in the same room as her, but they beckoned us in and then said that they were in the middle of checking ANAS's blood sugar level - for the last five days he had been suffering health problems and had just been diagnosed by the doctor as having diabetes. Eventually the wife shooed the children out but hovered around the door to listen to the conversation. The meeting was conducted in Arabic throughout.
4. ANAS asked me to repeat who we were and I said that I was from the Security Service - Scotland Yard? he queried; so I explained that Andy was from Scotland Yard and that I was from 'the mukhaberaat', although it was important for him to understand that we were not like the mukhaberaat in most Arab countries. He immediately agreed with this comment and said that he had previously been interviewed by Alan Macdonald [REDACTED]
5. I then said that, with the arrest of Abu QATADA, we would be able to focus more

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

attention on other members and groups in the extremist community. ANAS immediately said that he was not a member of such a group, although he conceded in response to my naming their names that he was a friend of Abu QATADA and Abu RASMEE. He explained that as a youth he had led a dissolute life but had then rediscovered Islam and had been to Afghanistan. It was there that he had met QATADA whom he considered to be a friend; there was no way that he would allow QATADA's family to go without food or assistance during QATADA's detention.

5. I told him that in addition to increased focus on UK based extremists, we were investigating reports of terrorists based abroad who were keen to mount attacks in the UK, possibly using biological or chemical weapons. He agreed that such people were correctly labelled terrorist. I told him that the use of such techniques would pose a threat to all residents of the UK, as biological weapons would not differentiate between Muslims and Christians, and that as the father of young children he should be concerned by such a possibility. Both ANAS and his wife who was standing by the door agreed with this. She then left to look after the children.

6. I continued saying that in the event of a successful attack in the UK, it was not possible to predict the government's reaction. It was quite possible that he could find himself swept up in a further round of detentions. He did however have a choice - he could continue with his current life or ...; at this point he interrupted to ask what I meant by his current life. I told him that I meant his association with members of the extremist community and also his involvement in criminal activity, like his recent arrest and caution for petty shoplifting in an Asda supermarket. He laughed and shook my hand saying that I knew everything. He went on to say that he was not involved in any extremist activity, he did not believe that people like RASMEE could be considered a threat to the UK and, indeed, there was a fatwa saying that Muslims should respect UK laws. I pointed out that there was also a fatwa which declared that Muslims in the UK could consider themselves to be in a state of jihad and could therefore take 'ghaneema' (spoils of war) from non Muslims. He again laughed but did not deny this.

7. He then went on to say that he was not a well man; in addition to diabetes he had trouble with his back due to beatings at the hands of the Jordanian authorities. He was only interested in providing for his children the opportunities that he himself had not had as a child. He assumed we knew about his business venture in Gambia with WAHAAB, which he hoped would prove profitable. He said he would be travelling the next day and asked whether he would be arrested or turned back at the airport. I said that if he had a valid travel document he should be able to travel without a problem. He then asked whether he would be able to get back into the country. I repeated the travel document point.

8. I returned to the choice which he could make; he could either continue as at present, with the risks that entailed, or he could start a new life with a new identity, new nationality, money to set himself up in business and to provide for his family, and an opportunity to move to a Muslim country where his children could be brought up away from the bad influences in Western society. He asked if I wanted him to leave the UK. I told him that that would be for him to decide but that I could help him if that was what he wanted. He said that his children were being brought up as British nationals, going to normal English schools; his life was now in UK. He then asked about progress on his application for UK nationality as he had completed the required years of residency. I told him that this was a decision for the Home Secretary; he queried whether the Home Secretary decided all cases or only his; I told him that the Home Secretary decided all

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

cases. I added that I was in a position to make recommendations to the Home Secretary but that the final decision rested with the Home Secretary. ANAS asked if the Home Secretary intended to grant his application; I said I did not know but that, if we were asked for a view, we would be obliged to report ANAS' previous involvement in Afghanistan and his association with persons currently detained for extremist activities.

9. I again returned to the choice he had; if he chose to help us by providing details of all his activities and contacts, we would assist him to create a new life for himself and his family. I told him that I did not expect him to give me an immediate answer, it was an important decision and he needed to think carefully about it.

10. ANAS then asked when he could expect the return of the items seized during a police raid on his house some time ago; he explained that his computer, videos, address books had all been taken and not returned. He was particularly keen to get family photographs back. I told him that I would try to find out what was happening and would let him know.

11. ANAS' wife had come back in by this time and asked whether we wanted some tea; we declined saying that we were ready to leave. Abu ANAS saw us to the door and waved us off cheerfully.

Comment

12. ANAS appeared cheerful and relaxed throughout, although always ready to learn what we knew about him. He maintained that he was not involved in any extremist activity and was focused on his family's welfare. He did not give any hint of willingness to co-operate with us. His desire for British nationality and the security that this would provide may be worth exploring further with him, should he return to the UK. [REDACTED] will make enquiries of SO 13 to establish the status of ANAS' possessions. It may be possible to arrange for the return of some of these items, even in ANAS's absence, to generate some goodwill.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CCO
CCO
CCO

OUT-TELEGRAM

Date: 1 November 2002

SUBJECT: Detention of Islamists at Gatwick Airport

THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN COMMUNICATED IN CONFIDENCE TO THE RECIPIENT GOVERNMENT AND SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. IT IS FOR RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS PURPOSES ONLY AND MAY NOT BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR OVERT, COVERT OR EXECUTIVE ACTION.

1. Three individuals associated with the prominent spiritual cleric Omar OTHMAN@ Abu QATADA were detained by members of the Anti-Terrorist branch at Gatwick airport on the 1 November 2002 under the Terrorism Act 2000. A search of their baggage revealed some form of home-made electronic device. Preliminary inquiries including X-ray suggest that it may be a timing device or could possibly be used as some part of a car-based IED. All three individuals were due to fly to Banjul, Gambia. At this time, this is for your information only. We intend to do further analysis of the recovered items and will revert in due course.

2. The three individuals were Bishr AL RAWI (23/12/67), an Iraqi Islamic extremist who is a member of Abu QATADA's close circle of associates, Abu ANAS@ Jamil Abdulatif Iylayan EL-BANNA@ Mohammed AL-QURAYSHI (28/5/62), formerly assessed to be Abu QATADA's financier and Abdallah ELJANOUDI (18/9/62) ELJANOUDI has been based in the UK for twelve years and was travelling on a UK passport. Secret and reliable intelligence indicated that these individuals were travelling to Gambia to invest in a peanut oil factory.

3. Kind regards.

NO DISSEMINATION WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORITY OF DAC CLARKE

BRIEFING NOTE No. 477/02

OPERATION REDHILL

Anti-Terrorist Branch
3rd November 2002

DAC CLARKE

1. At 12.35pm on Friday 1st November 2002 the following individuals were examined under Schedule 7 Terrorism Act 2000 at Gatwick Airport after attempting to board a flight to Gambia; Bisher AL RAWI of 4 Firgrove, New Malden, Surrey, Jamil EL-BANNA of 15 Tintem Avenue, NW8 and Abdallah EL-JANOUDI of 55 Fyfield, Six Acres Estate, N4
2. At the time of booking in the men had with them a black rucksack. The bag was searched, resulting in the discovery of various items which gave rise to the suspicion that they were engaged in terrorist activity. The items included a quick hardening rubber cement, small shovel, solder and solder iron, ratchet strapping, primus stove, circuit board in a heat sealed plastic, battery holders and rechargeable batteries.
3. EL-BANNA and AL-RAWI are both known and are members of Abu QATADA's circle of friends. During their Schedule 7 interviews they stated that they were in the process of setting up a peanut oil factory in Gambia. As a result of the items found in the rucksack they were all arrested under section 41 TACT 2000 and conveyed to DP.
4. Their addresses were searched and further items were recovered from a workshop at AL-RAWI's address (which is in fact the address of his sister's). The items recovered include a document relating to RPG-7 rocket launchers, further circuit boards similar to the one found in the rucksack, and watches in different states of repair.
5. On Saturday 2nd November 2002 a warrant for further detention was successfully applied for at Bow street Magistrates Court and is due to expire at noon on Tuesday 5th November 2002.
6. The first to be interviewed on Saturday was EL-JANOUDI and EL-BANNA. They both made 'no comment' during their interviews. An interview with AL-RAWI was unable to take place due to the fact that both he and his solicitor (Miss Gareth PEARCE) were tired.
7. On Sunday 3rd November 2002 AL-RAWI was interviewed. During which he stated that exhibit SJM/43 (electrical circuit with sockets and cigarette lighter connector) was produced by him from commercially available components as, a water prove battery charger. He added that he purchased a battery charger from Dixon's and adapted it to improve it's water proofing. He accepted that it was his that he packed the rucksack and that he handed it over to the airport staff when booking in. He claimed that those arrested with him had no knowledge of the device. He also accepted the notes from the port interview which explain that he was going out to Gambia to meet up with his brother to engage in a business enterprise (peanut oil factory). He claims that he has met Abu HAMZA and also Abu QATADA.

NO DISSEMINATION WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORITY OF DAC CLARKE

8. EL-BANNA was further interviewed. He denied any knowledge of exhibit SJM/43. He stated that it was engaged on a business trip to set up a peanut oil factory but he was unable to give it's location or name. The venture was being funded by AL-RAWI's brother, that he had had a business in India and has then shipped the machinery to Gambia. On the day that he travelled to Gatwick airport he states that all three of them were picked up by EL-JANOUDI's friend. That he in fact was picked up in the Edgware Road and the others from AL-RAWI's New Malden address. He was unable to name the driver. When asked about the rucksack he stated that it belonged to AL-RAWI and that while he did not know what it specifically contained but he believed that it contained tools for the project venture in Gambia. He hoped to be the foreman once the business was up and running.
9. When EL-JANOUDI was further interviewed he inferred that he was not aware of the contents of the rucksack but on legal advice declined to comment further. He made 'no comment' to further questions in relation to this matter.
10. It is anticipated that further interview will take place on Monday 4th November 2002 when the contents from a computer hard drive seized during the searches has been interrogated and when further information is available concerning the electrical items found in the rucksack.


Detective Inspector

Distribution list:

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Further copies as appropriate to the following:

ACSO
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CT
Exhibits

[REDACTED]

OUT-TELEGRAM

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Date: 4 November 2002

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Travellers to Gambia

THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN COMMUNICATED IN CONFIDENCE TO THE RECIPIENT GOVERNMENT AND SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. IT IS FOR RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS PURPOSES ONLY AND MAY NOT BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR OVERT, COVERT OR EXECUTIVE ACTION.

1. The following form of words can be passed to Gambian liaison:

BEGINS

1. Three individuals associated with the prominent spiritual cleric Omar OTHMAN@ Abu QATADA are due to travel to Gambia in the near future with the intention of opening a peanut oil factory. The three individuals are Bishr AL RAWI (23/12/67), an Iraqi Islamic extremist who is a member of Abu QATADA's close circle of associates, Abu ANAS@ Jamil Abdulatif Iylayan EL-BANNA@ Mohammed AL-QURAYSHI (28/5/62), formerly assessed to be Abu QATADA's financier and Abdallah ELJANOUDI (18/9/62). Little is known about ELJANOUDI but he has been based in the UK for twelve years and is travelling on a UK passport.

2. Abu QATADA is one of the leading Islamist spiritual advisors in Europe with extensive links to a wide range of terrorist groups, including Usama Bin LADEN's Al Qaida network. In 1995 he issued a fatwa justifying the killing of women and children who were relatives of the security forces in Algeria. Abu QATADA lends spiritual advice to and raises funds for terrorist groups. AL RAWI and Abu ANAS are part of Abu QATADA's inner circle of associates.

ENDS

[REDACTED]



3. We would be grateful for feedback on the reaction of the Gambians to this intelligence. In particular, we would be interested to learn if they are able to cover these individuals whilst they are in Gambia. We believe that the three individuals plan to reside in Gambia for around three months.

4. Kind regards.



CCD

LOOSE MINUTE

Date: 6 November 2002

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Baggage Search of Abu ANAS; 1 November 2002

We have spoken at length about this operation but, for the record, I thought you might wish to have a detailed list of what was found in each of the six bags [REDACTED]. As you are aware, the bags belonged to Abu ANAS and his two travelling companions; only one of them (bag 4) was labelled with the target's name.

2. The contents of the bags were as follows:

BAG 1 - a holdall containing c.20 copies of the Quran, sealed in shrink wrap plastic. [REDACTED] copied one of these. [REDACTED] offered to X-Ray the books and they were passed to HMCE officers. We discovered later that HMCE had found nothing untoward.

BAG 2 - a holdall containing c.300 copies of a card-bound pamphlet entitled "Three Letters on 1) The Description of the Prophet's Gusi, 2) The Description of the Prophet's Wudu, 3) The Description of the Prophet's Prayer". One of these was copied by [REDACTED]

Also in this bag were 2 copies of the Quran, one of which had a very small amount of Arabic writing in the back (copied by [REDACTED]) and 5 copies of Tafsir Ibn Kathir (abridged), another hardback book.

BAG 3 - a very large suitcase containing only clothes.

BAG 4 - a large suitcase with "Jamil" written in felt pen on the outside, containing clothes and a variety of medical products (bandages, plasters, *Panzadol*, etc) and toiletries (deodorants, razors, etc).

Bag 5 - a rucksack containing, in no particular order:

- a) A bundle of electric wires wrapped around a set of tweezers and a small pair of scissors;
- b) A "folding plotter";
- c) 3 Manuals for VHM FM Handheld Transceivers manufactured by ALINCO Inc. Written on these papers were several telephone numbers (already passed to you): 0870 9005505, 0870

[REDACTED]

1541102, 07774 507240, 01753 512600.

- d) An air pump manual;
- e) A retractable spade;
- f) FIELD AND TREK small bag with various equipment;
- g) Lo- tech drill bits etc;
- h) a gas cylinder;

As well as these (which is not an exhaustive list), there was an item which can best be described as a quantity of masking tape wrapped around an unidentified object. This had a metal sheet stuck to it, and wires leading from it to a battery pack (without batteries). Also connected to this were a series of clips on the ends of several other wires.

Bag 6- a standard size suitcase, containing:

- a) 5 pairs of *Salter* weighting scales (all boxed as new);
- b) a TECNICA INVERTOR 1000 (voltage inverter);
- c) various bits of electronic equipment.

3. [REDACTED] made copies of most of the above, and this should be available to you shortly. In the meantime, please do not hesitate to contact me if you wish to discuss any of the above.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

OUT-TELEGRAM

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Date: 8 November 2002

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Individuals Travelling to Gambia

THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE RECIPIENT GOVERNMENT IN CONFIDENCE AND SHALL NOT BE RELEASED WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

1. Further to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] dated 1 November and our telephone conversation today.
2. We are able to confirm that the three individuals associated with the prominent spiritual cleric Omar OTHMAN@ Abu QATADA who were arrested at Gatwick on 1 November have today boarded Sierra National Airlines Flight LJ054 to Banjul, Gambia. The flight was due to depart from the UK at 1230 but the departure was delayed until 1310.
3. The three individuals checked-in at the airport using the following variations of their names:

JAMIL ABDUL LATIF IYLAN (28/5/62)
BISHR QALID (23/12/67)
ABDALLAH GHAZI (18/9/62)

4. Regards.
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

OUT-TELEGRAM

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Date: 11 November 2002

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Individuals Detained in Gambia

1. Three individuals associated with the prominent spiritual cleric Omar OTHMAN @ Abu QATADA were detained in Banjul by the Gambian authorities on 8 November. Secret and reliable reporting had indicated that Jamil EL-BANNA @ Abu ANAS, Bishr AL RAWI and Wahab AL RAWI were travelling to Gambia to set up a groundnut oil factory.
 2. Abu ANAS (28/5/62) is a Jordanian Palestinian veteran of the Afghan-Soviet war and is assessed to be Abu QATADA's financier. Abu ANAS is in close contact with members of the GSPC and FIT and his home is reported to have been used by these groups as a meeting place.
 3. Bishr AL RAWI (23/12/67) is an Iraqi Islamist extremist who is a member of Abu QATADA's close circle of associates. He has previously come to our attention for his financial activities in connection with Abu ANAS. Bishr's enthusiasm for extreme sports has often brought him to the attention of the police. For example, he was seen driving away from the M4 flyover at Brentford in March 2001, which he and two other individuals had been seen climbing. He is also a qualified diver, a keen dinghy sailor and parachutist.
 4. Wahab AL RAWI, Bishr's brother, is a close associate of Abu ANAS. Secret and reliable reporting has indicated that Wahab was taking the lead in the plans for setting up the peanut oil factory. Further reporting has revealed that he travelled to Gambia on 28 October, in advance of Bishr and Abu ANAS.
 5. Bishr AL RAWI, Abu ANAS and a further individual Abdallah Ghazi EL JANOUDI attempted to travel to Gambia on 1 November. However, they were detained by members of the
- [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Anti-Terrorist Branch at Gatwick Airport under the Terrorism Act 2000. A search of their baggage revealed that they were carrying some form of suspicious home made electronic device. All three individuals were released on 4 November after it was assessed that the device was a commercially available battery charger that had been modified by Bishr AL RAWI in order to make it more powerful.

6. [REDACTED] EL JANOUDI (18/9/62), [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] He was born in Beirut and is now a naturalised British Citizen. Secret and reliable reporting has indicated that EL JANOUDI is a close associate of Bishr AL RAWI.

7. Bishr AL RAWI, Abu ANAS and EL JANOUDI returned to Gatwick on 8 November and departed for Gambia. Special Branch enquiries on the day revealed that a fourth individual, Ibrahim YOUSIF, had the same booking reference as the other three, indicating that he was travelling with them. YOUSIF removed himself from the aircraft before the gate closed, claiming that he was too ill to travel. Special Branch were notified and he was detained under the Terrorism Act 2000. During a police interview YOUSIF admitted that he was carrying a bag for the other three (a subsequent search of this bag had revealed numerous Qu'rans). YOUSIF was later released [REDACTED]

8. On arrival in Gambia on the evening of 8 November Bishr AL RAWI, Abu ANAS and EL JANOUDI were detained by the local authorities for questioning. Wahab AL RAWI and an individual called Omar OMARI [REDACTED] were also detained when they came to meet the other three at Banjul airport.

9. We are receiving updates from [REDACTED] regarding these detainees. We will forward any further relevant information in due course.

10. Regards,
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

OUT-TELEGRAM

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Date:

6 December 2002

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: ISLAMISTS IN DETENTION IN THE GAMBIA

Further to our telephone conversation, this is to confirm that in relation to Islamists currently in detention in The Gambia, the UK would not seek to extend consular protection to non-British nationals.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]